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INTRODUCTION
Colin Warner served twenty years in jail for a murder he did not com-
mit—his conviction based entirely on the testimony of a scared fourteen-
? Katherine Sheridan, J.D., Fordham University School of Law. 
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year-old boy who was coerced by police to implicate Warner.1  Mario 
Hamilton was shot and killed in April of 1980 in broad daylight near the 
Erasmus Hall High School in Flatbush, Brooklyn.2  Thomas Charlemagne 
stated that he had seen what happened, though in fact he had not.3  Charle-
magne was the only witness or lead that the police had on the killer, so they 
immediately brought him and the victim’s fifteen-year-old brother Martell 
(who was with Charlemagne) down to the station for questioning.4
Detectives presented Charlemagne with mug shots, including one of Co-
lin Warner,5 demanded an identification of the shooter, and grilled him for 
answers.6  At one point Charlemagne stated he had not seen the gun, but 
the police hung on his initial words—“I saw what happened”—and yelled 
back that there must have been a gun.7  Nearly fourteen hours after the start 
of the interrogation, Charlemagne ended the questioning the only way he 
knew how and pointed—at random—to Warner’s picture.8  He went on to 
elaborate on the lie, claiming the killer had spoken to him, and provided the 
details that the police fed him—that it was a drive-by and that there was 
passenger in the car.9  Meanwhile, Martell, still grieving over the news of 
his older brother’s murder, sat listening to the relentless interrogation and 
was released only after Charlemagne cooperated.10
1. This American Life 282: DIY, Chicago Public Radio (Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter 
This American Life], available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/2821diy; see also Diane Carwell, Man Says He Was Real Killer In 21-
Year-Old Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2001/01/25/nyregion/man-says-he-was-real-killer-in-21-year-old-murder-case.html (ex-
plaining how the witness was coerced to provide perjured testimony at Warner’s trial.); An-
dy Newman, Murder Conviction Overturned for Man Behind Bars 20 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/01/nyregion/murder-
conviction-overturned-for-man-behind-bars-20-years.html.
2. This American Life, supra note 1; Carwell, supra note 1. 
 3. Martell postured that Charlemagne was “perhaps trying to make me feel better or 
trying to be helpful.” This American Life, supra note 1. 
 4. The State never recovered a murder weapon nor found forensic evidence supporting 
Warner’s guilt. Id.  Moreover, the autopsy report of the victim revealed that the bullet had a 
downward trajectory, which was incompatible and physically impossible under the State’s 
theory of the case, provided by Charlemagne’s testimony that the murder occurred in a 
drive-by shooting. Id. 
 5. Warner had been previously arrested, charged, and sentenced to three years proba-
tion for gun possession after a stop-and-frisk in which a .38 caliber pistol without a trigger 
was found on his person. Curtis Harris, The Courage Of His Conviction, CITY LIMITS, Jan. 
1, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/2116/the-courage-of-his-
conviction/2. 
6. This American Life, supra note 1. 
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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The next day, police visited Martell at his home, presented him with four 
photos, and asked if he recognized any of the men.11  Martell said no over 
and over again, until the officer pushed one photo above the others, and 
asked specifically about Warner.12  Martell stated that “maybe he recog-
nized him,” which was enough to satisfy police that they had the right per-
son—despite lacking any other evidence.13  Based on Charlemagne’s testi-
mony14 and Martell’s corroboration, the State successfully convicted Colin 
Warner of second-degree murder, resulting in a sentence of fifteen years to 
life.15
The wrongful conviction of Colin Warner adeptly illustrates the prob-
lems caused by police coercion that will be subsequently explored in this 
Note.  Such coercive practices manufacture inherently unreliable evidence 
and are revolting to the sense of justice that Americans expect and demand 
from the United States’ legal system. 
In many criminal cases there is a lack of physical evidence despite the 
most sophisticated criminal forensic sciences, and the prosecution must 
build a case on statements made by the defendant or a witness.16  Predicta-
bly, criminal offenders and their cohorts do not ordinarily admit to wrong-
doing or divulge incriminating information.17  In turn, police interrogations 
are designed to persuade individuals to share information about the crime.18
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
 14. Charlemagne agreed to testify in court after he was arrested for armed robbery, and 
his testimony was likely a condition of a plea bargain. Id.
 15. Warner actually served twenty-one years in jail, and was then released—not on pa-
role—but subsequent to a court announcing his innocence. Id.  Although Warner was eligi-
ble for parole after fifteen years, Warner refused to admit his guilt and show remorse for the 
murder he was convicted of—a consideration of release on parole—because accepting re-
sponsibility would have required him to lie, something he was not willing to do. Id.; see also
In re Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 505 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that it was proper for the 
parole board to consider the remorse and insight of the prisoner). 
 16. Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16, 17-19 (1961); see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 
571 (1961) (“Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses fre-
quently occur about which things cannot be made to speak.  And where there cannot be 
found innocent human witnesses to such offenses, nothing remains—if police investigation 
is not to be balked before it has fairly begun—but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and 
ask them questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the 
offense precisely because they are suspected of implication in it.”). 
 17. Inbau, supra note 16, at 17 (“Self-condemnation and self-destruction not being nor-
mal behavior characteristics, human beings ordinarily do not utter unsolicited, spontaneous 
confessions.  They must be first be questioned regarding the offense.”); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 603 (5th ed. 2009). 
18. See Inbau, supra note 16, at 16; see also LAFAVE, supra note 17. 
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Indeed, police interrogations resulting in admissible statements promote 
the government’s strong interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes.19
As John Henry Wigmore noted, confessions are usually “the highest sort of 
evidence.”20  That is only true, however, where the confession is reliable as 
“trustworthy evidence of guilt.”21
The government’s ability to pursue its interest in law enforcement is 
checked by the right of an individual not to be compelled to testify against 
himself22 or to be persuaded to confess after enduring physical or extreme 
psychological pressure.23  The United States criminal justice system rests 
on the underlying principle that “ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisi-
torial system—a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence 
independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge 
against an accused.”24  Thus, the Supreme Court demands that police re-
frain from using coercive interrogation techniques to elicit involuntary con-
fessions from a criminal defendant.25  As a result of this rule, a defendant in 
a criminal case has a right to contest the voluntariness of a statement he has 
given to the police, and such statements are excluded if involuntary.26
Whether this right extends to allow defendants to object to the admit-
tance of an involuntary statement coerced from a witness is debated by 
judges across the country and remains unresolved by the Supreme Court.27
Such a right would have allowed Colin Warner to suppress Thomas Char-
lemagne’s statements at his trial, and avoid a wrongful conviction.28  To-
day, several courts recognize this expansion, finding that where a coerced 
witness’s statement is entered into evidence against the defendant, there is 
a violation of the defendant’s right to due process of law, and thus exclu-
19. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006); OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CONFESSIONS OF GUILT (1973). 
 20. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE § 866 (2d ed. 1923). 
 21. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 14 (Richard A. Leo & George 
C. Thomas, III eds., 1998). 
 22. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 23. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
324-25 (1937) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a minimum standard of 
fairness on the states, and requires state criminal trials to provide defendants with protec-
tions “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”). 
 24. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). 
25. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra note 186. 
28. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.  
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sion is the warranted remedy.29  Other courts, however, explicitly reject this 
notion, finding that it is an evidentiary matter, rather than a constitutional 
concern, and therefore hold that defendants have no standing to contest the 
alleged violations of the witness’s rights.30  In the absence of a Supreme 
Court ruling on the issue, courts have no binding authority to draw from 
and, as a result, the due process rights of a criminal defendant depend on 
the jurisdiction in which he is prosecuted. 
In early cases, the Supreme Court required exclusion of involuntary con-
fessions primarily on the grounds that they were not reliable, and therefore 
could not serve as the basis for a criminal conviction requiring proof of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.31  Over time, however, courts became 
more concerned with unfair police interrogation practices, even where they 
produced reliable statements.32  The purpose of exclusion thus became de-
terring the police from using coercive interrogation techniques that are ab-
horrent to an individual’s constitutional rights.33  Achieving this goal re-
quires excluding coerced statements made by both defendants and third 
parties.
Nevertheless, some scholars and judges argue that exclusion is falling 
out of favor, and should be abolished rather than expanded.34  While the 
exclusionary rule is riddled with exceptions as it relates to both unreasona-
ble search and seizure and self-incrimination violations, the same is not 
true as it applies to due process violations.  Thus, these arguments against 
the exclusionary rule do not withstand scrutiny when made in reference to 
the extension of the principle to the inadmissibility of coerced witness 
statements.  The exclusionary rule establishes an absolute bar on the admis-
sibility of coerced statements made by the defendant, suggesting that the 
judiciary finds these due process violations most troubling.  It stands to rea-
son that all coercive statements pose a similarly severe threat to due 
process rights.  Nevertheless, the Court has not yet addressed whether the 
Due Process Clause also protects defendants from the admission of an in-
voluntary statement made by a witness—this Note argues that it must. 
Part I considers the historical background of the use of involuntary 
statements under the Due Process Clause, following the development of ju-
29. See infra notes 225-256 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 217-224 and accompanying text.  
31. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. 
 34. For arguments about the value of the exclusionary rule, see William J. Stuntz, The 
Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443 (1997). See
generally Donald A. Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still Preoccu-
pied with 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence,” 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743 (2010). 
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risprudence in this area to present day.  Specifically, this section addresses 
the evolution of the Court’s underlying justifications for the exclusion of 
coerced confessions as an analytical basis for the arguments made in Part 
III.  Part II lays out the approach taken by various state, district, and circuit 
courts that have addressed this matter, and details how those courts employ 
different Due Process Clause analyses to reach divergent conclusions.  Fi-
nally, Part III explains why involuntary witness statements should be ex-
cluded under the Due Process Clause in criminal trials. 
I. POLICE COERCION AND DUE PROCESS
Because the Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of 
government use of coerced witness testimony against a criminal defendant, 
it is necessary to consider established legal principles upon which courts 
rely when faced with this unsettled issue.  Thus, the following topics will 
be examined: the origins of confession jurisprudence; the modern concep-
tion of confession jurisprudence; and the exclusionary rule and standing as 
they relate to due process, self-incrimination, and search and seizure viola-
tions. 
A. Origins of Confession Jurisprudence 
The early common law rule that governed the admissibility of confes-
sions was simple: confessions were admissible at trial without any restric-
tion, even if the statement was obtained by torture.35  Over time, restric-
tions were put into place to limit this rule as courts aimed to regulate the 
reliability of evidence entered into a criminal trial to prove the defendant’s 
guilt.36
The common law rule of evidence, deriving from both English and U.S. 
jurisprudence, deems involuntary confessions to be “inherently unrelia-
ble”—a term to express the idea that when a defendant is coerced, his con-
temporaneous statements are not a product of his free choice, but rather, a 
reaction to the coercion itself: the defendant confesses to escape an aver-
sive interrogation, secure a promised benefit, or avoid a threatened harm.37
Because these statements are inherently unreliable, they are of insufficient 
 35. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 343. 
36. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
37. See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntari-
ness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 98-100 (1989); see also Ste-
ven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
309, 320-22 (1998). 
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quality to be admissible into evidence against a criminal defendant.38  The 
reliability of a confession is the paramount concern at common law, as reli-
able evidence is required to ensure a fair trial, uphold the integrity of the 
evidentiary system by requiring the admitted evidence be trustworthy, and 
avoid the harsh consequences of falsity—inter alia, the conviction of an 
innocent man.39
Under the common law, the reliability of an out-of-court statement turns 
on whether the statement was voluntary.40  In framing reliability around the 
speaker’s ability to act on his own free will, the common law assumes that 
innocent men under normal circumstances do not voluntarily confess to 
crimes they did not commit.  Thus, courts look at the circumstances sur-
rounding the confession to determine if the out-of-court statement is a reli-
able admission of guilt.41
An example of how police coercion can overwhelm the free will of a 
suspect is the Central Park Jogger case, where innocent boys confessed to a 
crime they did not commit and subsequently served eight to ten years in 
jail.42  In this case, five teenage boys between the ages of fourteen and six-
38. See, e.g., Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (“But the 
presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence, namely, that one who is innocent 
will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the 
confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal 
nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or 
promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of 
the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control 
essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.”); King v. Rudd, 1 
Leach 115, 117-18, 122-23 (K.B. 1783) (Lord Mansfield C.J.) (stating that the English 
courts excluded confessions obtained by threats and promises); King v. Warickshall, 1 
Leach 262, 263-64 (K.B 1783) (“[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of 
hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to 
be given to it.”). 
39. See Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 954, 962 (1966). 
40. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585 (stating that when police conduct is coercive in nature, the 
state will “deprive [the accused] of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his 
confession voluntary within the meaning of the law”) (alteration in original). 
41. Id. at 583 (“The admissibility of such evidence [confessions] so largely depends 
upon the special circumstances connected with the confession . . . .”) (alteration in original). 
 42. Yusef Salaam, Antron McCray, Raymond Santana, Kevin Richardson, and Kharey 
Wise, 
were arrested, tried and convicted for a number of serious crimes.  The charges 
against them included the rape, assault and attempted murder of Patricia Meili, a 
woman brutally attacked on April 19, 1989 while jogging in Central Park.  The lo-
cal and national press covered their prosecution, and the cases against them gener-
ated significant media attention.  The matter became known as the “Central Park 
Jogger” case. 
McCray v. City of New York, 03 Civ. 9685, 9974 & 10080, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90875, 
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2007) (internal citations omitted).  The convictions were over-
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teen made inculpatory statements after having been detained for twenty-
eight hours and lied to by police.43  Based on the oral statements made dur-
ing the detainment, the five men were prosecuted and convicted for various 
crimes arising from the beating, rape, and robbery of a twenty-eight year 
old jogger.44  The young men subsequently served between eight to ten 
years in jail.45  Fifteen years later, in January 2002, a man named Matias 
Reyes confessed to being the sole attacker in the case, and DNA testing 
confirmed his guilt.46
When the court vacated the convictions in 2002,47 the court did not go so 
far as to say that the original confessions were involuntary.48  However, 
turned eighteen years later. See People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) [he-
reinafter Wise II]. 
 43. District Attorney Morgenthau summarized the boys statement as follows: 
[E]ach of the statements cast the speaker in a relatively minor role, and none of 
the defendants admitted that he personally raped her.  Kevin Richardson stated 
that he grabbed at the jogger, but equivocated about it and, at least on video, 
stopped short of saying that he did so to assist in an assault or rape.  Antron 
McCray said that he kicked the jogger and lay on top of her, but did not penetrate 
her.  Raymond Santana finally stated that he “felt her tits.”  And Kharey Wise 
eventually said that he held and fondled her leg.  Yusef Salaam, in his unrecorded 
statement, went furthest in ascribing culpability to himself, by saying that he 
struck the jogger with a pipe at the inception of the incident. 
Affirmation in Response to Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction at 44, Wise II, 752 
N.Y.S.2d. 837 (No. 4762/89).  See the related proceedings at People v. Wise, 204 A.D.2d 
133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); People v. Richardson, 202 A.D.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); 
People v. McCray, 198 A.D.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); People v. Salaam, 187 A.D.2d 
363, 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).  Defendant-Santana, who was tried jointly with Salaam 
and McCray, did not perfect an appeal until 2002. See Wise II, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 483.   
44. Wise, 204 A.D.2d at 133 (Defendant-Wise was convicted by jury of assault in the 
first-degree, sexual abuse in the first-degree, and riot in the first-degree); Richardson, 202 
A.D.2d at 227 (Defendant-Richardson was convicted by jury of attempted murder in the 
second-degree, rape in the first-degree, sodomy in the first-degree and robbery in the first-
degree); McCray, 198 A.D.2d at 200 (Defendant-McCray was convicted by jury of rape in 
the first-degree and robbery in the first-degree); Salaam, 187 A.D.2d at 363 (Defendant-
Salaam was convicted by jury of rape in the first-degree and robbery in the first-degree). 
45. Wise, 204 A.D.2d at 133 (Defendant-Wise was sentenced to concurrent terms of five 
to fifteen years, one and one-third to seven years, and one to three years); Richardson, 202 
A.D.2d at 227 (Defendant-Richardson was sentenced to an aggregate term of five to ten 
years); McCray, 198 A.D.2d at 200 (Defendant-McCracy was sentenced to consecutive 
terms of three and one-third to ten years); Salaam, 187 A.D.2d at 363 (Defendant-Salaam 
was sentenced to consecutive terms of three and one-third to ten years). 
46. Wise II, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (“It is uncontested that in January 2002, Matias Reyes, 
for the first time, informed law enforcement officials that he, alone, committed the rape and 
other crimes concerning the female jogger, for which several defendants were convicted, 
and that DNA testing confirms his participation in the rape.”). 
47. Id. at 850 (“Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that if the statement and the 
forensic evidence, related to Matias Reyes, were available at the time of trial, there exists a 
reasonable probability that the verdicts in the defendants’ trials would have been more fa-
vorable to defendants.  Accordingly, defendants’ motion to vacate judgment and order a 
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even District Attorney Morgenthau publically questioned the strength of 
the 1993 confessions that led to the convictions.49  The exact details of 
what happened during the interrogations leading up to the confessions was 
disputed at trial, but the boys and their parents claimed that the interroga-
tions were highly coercive, and specifically alleged that the officers slapped 
the boys.50  What is known is that the boys were detained for twenty-eight 
hours, played against each other, shown pictures of the crime scene, and 
given the explicit promise that if they confessed, they would be treated as 
witnesses, not suspects.51
The Central Park Jogger case clearly illustrates that false confessions do 
not simply occur, but are reactions to external pressures or promises.52
Coerced statements, even where corroborated must not always be taken at 
face value.53  Importantly, the common law rule seeks to protect the integri-
ty of the judicial system by requiring that evidence admitted in a criminal 
trial be a reliable representation of fact.54
The common law rule of evidence is doctrinally important in confession 
jurisprudence because the Supreme Court has adopted its “voluntariness” 
standard in constitutional confession jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court 
recognizes two constitutional grounds on which involuntary statements by 
a criminal defendant are inadmissible—the Fifth Amendment55 right 
against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
new trial, based on newly discovered evidence, must be granted as to all of the remaining 
convictions.”). 
48. Id. at 846.  Even in 2002, the court failed to address the circumstances surrounding 
the various “incriminating statements linking them [the defendants] to the crime scene” that 
were made after the boys were apprehended.
 49. Affirmation in Response to Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction at 44, Wise II,
752 N.Y.S.2d. 837 (No. 4762/89) (“Perhaps the most persuasive fact about the defendants’ 
confessions is that they exist at all.  While all of the defendants began by denying know-
ledge of the attack, each ultimately made himself an accomplice in a terrible crime.”). See 
generally Phil Hirschkorn, Prosecutor: Drop All Convictions in Central Park Jogger Case,
CNN.COM (Dec. 10, 2002), http//:www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/05/central.park.jogger/. 
 50. TIMOTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS 80, 
280-81 (1992) (documenting that Kharey Wise claimed he was slapped by a detective in the 
head four times). 
51. Id. at 80, 182-87, 280-81 (Defendant-Wise and the parents of Defendant-McCray 
testified at trial that detectives promised that the boys could go home if they confessed); see 
generally DA Wants Central Park Convictions Tossed, ABC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2002), 
www.abcnews.go.com/us/story?id=91009&page=1. 
52. E.g., supra notes 42-51; see also Nadia Soree, Comment, When the Innocent Speak: 
False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 191, 193-95 (2005). 
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Soree, supra note 52.  
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 55. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Amendment.56  The law concerning these two constitutional guarantees, in 
the context of police coercion, will be discussed below. 
B. Due Process Protection 
In 1884, Hopt v. Utah explicitly recognized the common law voluntary 
confession rule prohibiting the use of confessions obtained by inducements, 
promises, or threats.57  The rule was based on the premise that confessions 
resulting from promises or threats are unreliable and therefore could not be 
admitted into evidence.58  However in 1897, just thirteen years after Hopt,
the Supreme Court expanded the purview of confession jurisprudence by 
expressing a concern for police overreaching.59  Thus, in Bram v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that the use of involuntary confessions vi-
olated the constitutional bar on compelled incrimination.60  The Bram
Court created a bright line rule, excluding any confession extracted by 
threat, violence, or promises “however slight.”61
In 1936, confession jurisprudence again changed directions: Brown v. 
Mississippi analyzed the admissibility of an involuntary confession under 
the Fourteenth Amendment62 and focused on the underlying police mis-
 56. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a minimum standard of fair-
ness on the states, and requires state criminal trials to provide defendants with protections 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”). 
 57. 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (“[W]hen the confession appears to have been made either 
in consequence of inducements . . . or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of 
such person, which . . . deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make 
his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.”). 
58. Id. (“[T]he presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence [voluntary 
confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his 
interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made” 
involuntarily). 
59. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 60. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (“In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, whe-
rever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue 
is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no person ‘shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”) (citation omitted). 
61. Id. at 543.  The Court reasoned that “the law cannot measure the force of the influ-
ence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes 
the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted.” Id. at 565 (internal quotations 
omitted) (citation omitted). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”).  The Fifth Amendment is applicable to federal 
actors, and the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to state actors. See Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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conduct.63  In Brown, several African-American tenant farmers accused of 
murdering a white farmer were whipped, pummeled, and tortured until they 
provided detailed confessions of the crime.64  The Supreme Court reversed 
the convictions, holding that the Due Process clause requires that state ac-
tion be “consistent with the fundamental principles and liberties which lie 
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”65 Brown explicitly in-
corporated the voluntary confession rule—which was first pronounced un-
der the common law to ensure reliability of evidence—as a constitutional 
guarantee to due process of law.66
In modern due process jurisprudence, it is unequivocal that the Four-
teenth Amendment67 regulates state conduct by prohibiting police from 
coercing a criminal defendant.68  Thus, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
required a confession to be “voluntary” to provide sufficient due process of 
law.69  Over the years, cases in this area have brought to light that the vo-
luntariness requirement reflects two important policies: (1) determination 
of coerced confessions as unreliable because of the practices used to obtain 
them;70 and (2) deterrence of offensive police practices through exclusion 
 63. Brown v Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (finding that due process of law for-
bids the admission of a confession if obtained by state infliction of torture on the suspect). 
64. Id. at 282.  The Brown defendants, 
not only confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded by those 
present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the crime, and as the whip-
pings progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession in 
all particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of their torturers. When 
the confessions had been obtained in the exact form and contents as desired by the 
mob, they left with the parting admonition and warning that, if the defendants 
changed their story at any time in any respect from that last stated, the perpetrators 
of the outrage would administer the same or equally effective treatment. 
Id.
65. Id. at 286 (citation omitted). 
66. Id. (reversing a criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it was based on a confession obtained by physical coercion and was 
thus involuntary); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (stating that the volunta-
riness test “is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no 
person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’”). 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also supra note 62. 
 68.  The Due Process Clause requires that “state action . . . be consistent with the fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice.” Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. 
 69. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 146 n.1 (1944) (admissibility of a confession 
is “largely a question of fact as to whether or not a confession is voluntary”) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
70. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285 (finding that the confessions of the farmers were of doubtful 
reliability because they had been tortured by state agents until they confessed); see also LA-
FAVE, supra note 17, at 344 (stating that Brown can be read as announcing a “due process 
test for excluding confessions obtained under circumstances presenting a fair risk that the 
statements are false. . . . [This] led many state courts to the conclusion that unfairness in vi-
olation of due process exists when a confession is obtained under circumstances affecting its 
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of this evidence, even where the reliability of a confession is not in ques-
tion (i.e., where there is strong corroborating evidence).71
Since Brown the “voluntariness” requirement has evolved to reflect a 
“complex of values” that underlie “the stricture against use by the state of 
confessions.”72  The “voluntary” status of a confession is determined by the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements.73  The crux of this 
inquiry is the nature of the police conduct and its effect on the specific de-
fendant.74  Some police conduct is considered to be “inherently coercive” 
and requires no further inquiry.75  Examples include torture,76 physical vi-
olence,77 the threat of mob violence,78 being forced to sit naked in jail,79
testimonial trustworthiness”). But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (re-
jecting, in dicta, that the unreliability of a confession is a concern of due process analysis).  
In the facts of Connelly, however, no police overreaching was at play. See also infra note 
88.
 71. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“[T]he aim of the requirement of 
due process is . . . to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or 
false.”); see also, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).  In Rogers, the Court 
found that a confession made by the defendant after the police pretended to order his ailing 
wife to be arrested for questioning was involuntary, and was excluded to deter oppressive 
and unfair police interrogation methods. Id. 
 72. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (“Thus a complex of values under-
lies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient short-
hand, this Court terms involuntary, and the role played by each in any situation varies ac-
cording to the particular circumstances of the case.”). 
 73. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“In determining whether a 
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation.”); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207 (“complex of values”); Developments in the 
Law: Confessions, supra note 39, at 962. 
 74. The Supreme Court has explained that coerced confessions must be overturned “not 
because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract 
them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an 
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system . . . .”  Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41. 
 75. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (finding that when outrageous police 
conduct has occurred, “there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the in-
dividual victim”). 
76. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936).  In Brown, one defendant was 
found to be tortured where, after he denied his involvement in the accused crime, the offic-
ers “hanged the defendant by a rope to the limb of a tree, and having let him down, they 
hung him again, and when he was let down the second time, and he still protested his inno-
cence, he was tied to a tree and whipped.” See also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying 
text. 
77. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281. 
78. Stein, 346 U.S. at 156 (interrogating officer threatened defendant that unless he con-
fessed, the officer would leave him to an angry mob waiting outside the jailhouse door). 
 79. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (confession determined involuntary 
when defendant was taken to a hotel room by police and stripped before questioning). 
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and holding defendant incommunicado for thirty-six hours without food, 
water, or sleep.80
Where the police conduct is not inherently coercive, the circumstances 
surrounding the confession are taken into consideration.81  Relevant cir-
cumstances include, credible threats of violence,82 explicit promises that 
are untrue,83 manufactured false evidence,84 whether the defendant was 
subject to lengthy and uninterrupted periods of interrogation,85 and whether 
the police induced a credible fear that the defendant would not see his 
child,86 or be able to support that child if incarcerated.87  State misconduct 
is a prerequisite to due process violations, thus, if no indicia of coercive 
conduct are found to have occurred at the time of the confession, the volun-
tariness inquiry will end.88
 80. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (confession is involuntary when 
the defendant was held incommunicado for thirty-six hours without sleep or rest and was 
interrogated by relays of officers and investigators). 
 81. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (“In short, the true test of admissi-
bility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or induce-
ment of any sort. . . . And, of course, whether the confession was obtained by coercion or 
improper inducement can be determined only by an examination of all of the attendant cir-
cumstances.”). 
 82. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991) (confession is involuntary 
when defendant was promised protection by a fellow inmate if he told the truth about what 
had occurred from violence of other inmates if they found out that defendant killed his 
daughter). 
 83. United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1027 (3d Cir. 1993) (confession is involunta-
ry where the officer, a longtime friend of the defendant, promises to keep a conversation 
“off the record” and then does not do so). 
 84. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1989) (confession is in-
voluntary when police fabricated a scientific report for use as a ploy in interrogating the de-
fendant). 
 85. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (confession is involuntary where defen-
dant was subjected to many hours of day-and-night questioning by police officers as a mur-
der suspect). 
 86. United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (confession involuntary 
where induced by police that told defendant she would not see her child for “a while”). 
 87. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (confession is involuntary where de-
fendant confessed “only after the police had told her that state financial aid for her infant 
children would be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she did not ‘cooperate’”). 
 88. The mere presence of a state actor when the defendant confesses, is not enough to 
raise due process concerns. Connelly v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).  For example, 
in Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer and stated that he had murdered 
someone. Id. at 160.  He later claimed that he was following “the voice of god” in confes-
sion. Id. at 161.  The Court found that the statements were voluntary because no “police 
overreaching” had taken place. Id. at 167. 
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If there is any evidence that coercive conduct took place,89 the court will 
continue the “voluntary” inquiry by focusing on the individual characteris-
tics of the defendant in order to determine if that particular defendant’s 
statement was made voluntarily.90  The factors taken into account include 
the youth of the accused,91 his lack of education or low intelligence,92 and 
whether he is foreign-born or a native American.93  No one factor will be 
conclusive, but rather all the circumstances will be considered together to 
paint an overall picture of whether the confession was voluntary.94
In Rogers v. Richmond, the “voluntary” inquiry of the due process anal-
ysis was expressed as whether the interrogation exerted sufficient pressure 
on an individual to overbear his independent free will or capacity for auto-
nomous choice.95  This formulation of the test persists in modern due 
process analysis.96
However, the voluntariness test of due process jurisprudence undertakes 
a fact-specific analysis and leaves police with little guidance.97  Typically, 
 89. Importantly, in Connelly, the Court made clear that police coercion was a prerequi-
site to finding that the will of the accused had been overborne, and rejected the notion that 
reliability of the statement was alone, enough to be “involuntary.” Id. at 167. See also supra
note 88. 
90. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163 (“[C]ertain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or 
as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized 
system of justice that they must be condemned.”) (internal quotations omitted); LAFAVE,
supra note 17, at 348 (“Especially in an otherwise close case, it is appropriate also to take 
into account the particular characteristics of the person subject to interrogation, in order to 
judge the extent of his ability to resist the external pressures brought to bear upon him.”). 
 91. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948) (relevant that the defendant was fif-
teen-years-old, and refused the aid of family, friends, or counsel during interrogation). 
 92. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562-63 (1958) (relevant that the defendant was 
nineteen-years-old, but had only a fifth grade education). 
 93. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1959) (relevant that the defendant was 
foreign-born). 
94. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164 (“But this fact does not justify a conclusion that a defen-
dant’s mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever 
dispose of the inquiry into constitutional ‘voluntariness.’”). 
 95. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (finding that the voluntary standard 
under due process analysis ultimately asked whether the police pressures were such “as to 
overbear the petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-
determined—a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner 
in fact spoke the truth”). 
96. Id.; see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (“That there was a 
credible threat of physical violence, we agree with . . . [the lower court’s] conclusion that 
Fulminante’s will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of 
coercion.”). 
 97. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 349 (“One major defect in the due process ‘voluntariness’ 
test is that it leaves police without needed guidance.  This is attributable to the fact that the 
term itself is imprecise.  Virtually all incriminating statements—even those made under 
brutal treatment—are ‘voluntary’ in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives, yet 
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the evidence of involuntariness rests on the conflicting testimony of the de-
fendant and police officers, making it impossible for the courts to deter-
mine the “facts” of what happened.98  Needless to say, without video cov-
erage of the interrogation, the “he-said, she-said” due process test tilts in 
the government’s favor.99
From the start, the administration of the due process voluntariness test 
was problematic and prompted courts to regulate confessions under the ru-
bric of other constitutional guarantees:100 the right of prompt appearance, 
the right to counsel, and the privilege from self-incrimination.101  While 
these guarantees further protect a criminal defendant in the pre-trial stages 
of his case, they do nothing to clarify the voluntariness requirement in due 
process analysis when it is required.  The privilege of self-incrimination 
does, however, narrow the instances where due process analysis is needed.  
The Supreme Court created a bright line rule that police compulsion (as 
opposed to police coercion)102 inherent to a custodial interrogation renders 
a suspect’s statements involuntary unless the police have informed the sus-
pect of certain constitutional rights that he holds,103 and the suspect has vo-
luntarily waived those rights.104  The next section explores the privilege of 
self-incrimination, and its treatment of  “involuntary” confessions. 
very few are ‘voluntary’ in the sense that they would have been given absent official pres-
sure of some kind.”). 
98. Id. at 350 (stating that a swearing contest over what happened behind closed doors 
makes it difficult for the court to determine what really occurred). 
99. Id. (the totality of the circumstances approach facilitates pro-police rulings at the 
suppression hearings). 
100. Id.
101. Id.  The right to prompt appearance and right to counsel are outside the scope of this 
Note and will not be further discussed.  For more information on how these constitutional 
guarantees protect a defendant, see id. at 350-66. 
 102. In the context of confession jurisprudence, there is an important difference between 
police compulsion and coercion.  The test for “compulsion” is objective, and is satisfied by 
the mere presence of atmospheric pressure inherent in custodial interrogations. See infra
notes 105-119 and accompanying text.  The presumption of compulsion is rebutted when 
Miranda warnings are given to the defendant, and he knowingly and voluntarily waives his 
rights before speaking. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.  Police coercion on 
the other hand eludes a concrete definition, and is determined by the court’s examination of 
the totality of the circumstances. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.  Any police 
activity that goes beyond merely questioning the defendant in a custodial interrogation will 
be at risk of being found coercive, as the police conduct is looked at in light of the individu-
al characteristics of the defendant. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
103. See infra note 106. 
104. See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text. 
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C. Custodial Interrogations and Police Compulsion 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court found that the pressures inhe-
rent in a custodial interrogation undercut the suspect’s ability to make vo-
luntary statements—even absent physical or psychological coercion—and 
thus held that a suspect’s statements made in this situation are presumed 
involuntary105 unless specific safeguards were taken by the police, namely 
that the suspect was notified of certain constitutional rights,106 and waived 
them before speaking.107  A custodial interrogation is simply a situation 
where police initiate questioning of the suspect while he is in-custody,108 or 
is “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”109  Since Mi-
randa, it is unequivocal that the Fifth Amendment110 privilege from self-
incrimination regulates government conduct by prohibiting police compul-
sion, and requires that a suspect’s confession be voluntary to be admissible 
at his trial.111
Law enforcement officials are able to dispel the inherent atmospheric 
pressure of custodial interrogations and rebut the presumption that the 
statements are involuntary by deploying sufficient safeguards, famously 
 105. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1967) (“[T]he process of in-custody inter-
rogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures 
which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where 
he would not otherwise do so freely.”). 
 106. These rights include: (1) the right to remain silent, with the knowledge that any 
statements he does make will be used as evidence against him; and, (2) the right to an attor-
ney, either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
107. Id. (“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
 108. Whether one is in “custody” is determined by satisfaction of the Mendenhall, “free 
to leave,” two-pronged test. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).  First, 
the police conduct must communicate to a reasonable person that the person was not free to 
decline the officers’ request or otherwise terminate the encounter; and second, the individual 
must actually submit to the officers’ authority. Id. at 554-55.  In Mendenhall, the Court de-
termined that the defendant was not in custody when she was stopped in the airport by Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel, who identified themselves as agents, but 
were not in uniform. Id. at 555.  The DEA agents had merely requested to see the defen-
dant’s identification and tickets in a public concourse. Id.
109. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning in-
itiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”). 
 110. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
111. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465 n.33 (“[T]he defendant’s constitutional rights have been 
violated if his conviction is based, in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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known as the Miranda warnings.112  Adequate Miranda warnings make the 
suspect aware of certain constitutional rights.113
Miranda procedures are intended to protect the suspect by giving him 
the information necessary to make rational decisions during the interroga-
tion.114  Additionally, Miranda warnings protect the fairness of the trial it-
self by excluding presumptively false statements made as a consequence of 
police compulsion.115
These warnings are limited in scope—they cover only those confessions 
made during a custodial interrogation, and importantly, only protect indi-
viduals from police compulsion.116  Failure to administer Miranda warn-
ings to the defendant results in the exclusion of statements at his trial, re-
gardless of the statements reliability.117 Miranda, however, has become 
customary procedure, and the greater issue arises when Miranda rights are 
112. Id. at 467 (“In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to 
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effec-
tively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”). 
113. Id.  Although the exact warnings may vary, in general the police will state: “[Y]ou 
have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court 
of law.  You have the right to an attorney.  If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be ap-
pointed to you.  Do you understand these rights as they have been read to you?” Stephan J. 
Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishing Small Costs, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996). 
 114. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (Mi-
randa reflects “many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations . . . our prefe-
rence for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that 
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense 
of fair play which dictates ‘a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to 
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the 
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load’; our respect for the 
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual ‘to a private en-
clave where he may lead a private life’; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our 
realization that the privilege, while sometimes ‘a shelter to the guilty,’ is often ‘a protection 
to the innocent’”) (citations omitted). 
 115. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (“Nor does the Fifth Amendment 
‘trial right’ protected by Miranda serve some value necessarily divorced from the correct 
ascertainment of guilt.”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973) (the Miran-
da Court “made it clear that the basis for decision was the need to protect the fairness of the 
trial itself”); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966) (finding that Miranda warn-
ings protect against “the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of incustody 
[sic] interrogation,” and serves to guard against “the use of unreliable statements at trial”); 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (“[A] system of criminal law enforcement 
which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more 
subject to abuses” than a system relying on independent investigation). 
116. See supra note 102. 
 117. Statements made before Miranda warnings are given are often called “Miranda-
defective.”  After Miranda warnings are issued, the defendant is sometimes called “Miran-
dized.” Schulhofer, supra note 113, at 500. But see supra note 115 (for cases that recognized 
the effect that Miranda rights have on ensuring reliable evidence). 
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waived.  Approximately four-out-of-five suspects waive their Miranda
rights—which leaves the Due Process Clause as their only protection.118
Once again, a criminal defendant’s constitutional protection from police 
pressure is limited to the Due Process Clause.119
D. The Exclusionary Rule and Standing 
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions 
that significantly expanded the procedural guarantees in a criminal pro-
ceeding.120  These added protections aim to prevent police misconduct—
and in part, were a direct response to the inadequacy of the “voluntariness” 
requirement of the Due Process Clause.121
Violations of a criminal defendant’s constitutional protections are reme-
died in two ways: (1) allowing the defendant to bring a civil action against 
the violating officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;122 and (2) excluding the un-
constitutionally obtained evidence at the victim’s trial.123
The first remedy, allowing the victim to bring a civil action, is unfavora-
ble because of two major obstacles that these suits present: (1) criminal de-
fendants are likely to be unsympathetic plaintiffs, which makes winning a 
 118. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990’s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860 tbl.3 (1996) (83.7% waiver 
rate); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 
276 tbl.3 (1996) (78% waiver rate). 
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 120. The Bill of Rights was extended to state criminal proceedings to give defendants the 
right to a jury trial, the right to a speedy trial, the right to confront witnesses, the right to as-
sistance of counsel, the protection against unreasonable searches or seizures, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See Argersinger v. Hamilton, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to 
counsel for petty offenses); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privi-
lege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to coun-
sel in felony trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure). 
 121. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 350; Police Coercion of Witnesses, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 
865, 865 (“An important policy objective of this expanded application of constitutional 
guarantees to criminal procedures is to deter the police from engaging in illegal methods of 
law enforcement.”). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
123. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56 (finding that when a constitutional privilege is denied, the 
defendant is entitled to “the exclusion of the [resulting] evidence”). 
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case more difficult;124 and (2) collecting on a favorable judgment is often 
futile because the offending officer is unable to pay.125  Moreover, police 
officers exercising discretion are entitled to qualified immunity, so that 
even if they violated the Constitution, the victim does not recover unless 
the law was clearly established at the time of the conduct.126
The second remedy, excluding the unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
at the victim’s trial, is constitutionally required and provides immediate re-
lief to the victim.127  The main purpose of this remedy, referred to as “the 
exclusionary rule,” is to deter police from violating the constitutional rights 
of individuals.128  This policy is derived from a “deep-rooted feeling that 
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”129  The rationale is 
that by excluding illegally obtained evidence from trial, a police officer 
will be hesitant to resort to illegal and offensive interrogation techniques in 
the future because he knows that the fruits of his efforts will be disregarded 
by the court. 
 124. Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 567 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A criminal is not a very ap-
pealing tort plaintiff . . . .”). 
125. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVESTIGATIVE 596 
(8th ed. 2007). 
 126. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as 
their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable person would have known.”). 
 127. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914) (holding that evidence obtained in vi-
olation of the Constitution must be excluded from presentation in federal courts); see also
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (expanding exclusion of illegally obtained evidence to state courts 
and stating that the exclusionary rule is a “clear, specific, and constitutionally required—
even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard” from state misconduct).  To benefit from 
the exclusionary rule, the defendant may file a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds 
that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Constitution. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 
513.  At the request of the defense, a trial judge must conduct a pretrial hearing outside the 
presence of the jury to determine voluntariness before the government may introduce testi-
monial evidence obtained from the defendant. See Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 543-44 
(1967) (“[A] jury is not to hear a confession unless and until the trial judge has determined 
that it was freely and voluntarily given.”); see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 
(1964) (finding that the defendant has a right to “a fair hearing and a reliable determination 
on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the con-
fession”).
 128. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (finding that the main purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter violations of the Constitution); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 
(“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitution-
al guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 129. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) (stating that the exclusionary rule 
is based on the idea that “in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal 
methods used to convict thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves”). 
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The exclusionary rule also serves to protect the credibility and dignity of 
the judiciary.130  Courts sometimes refer to the rule as “the imperative of 
judicial integrity,” which must be followed so that courts will not become 
“accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn 
to uphold.”131  Furthermore, the exclusionary rule serves to uphold public 
trust in the judicial system, by ensuring the public that police officers will 
not profit from their misconduct.132
For a defendant to be entitled to exclusion of evidence he must have 
standing—meaning that he must be a proper party to assert the claim of il-
legality and seek the remedy of exclusion.133  To establish standing, the 
party seeking exclusion must demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome 
of the controversy.”134  A criminal defendant clearly has such a stake in the 
outcome of his own trial.135  A criminal defendant, however, does not au-
tomatically have standing to raise all constitutional issues bearing on his 
trial.136  This limitation will depend on the constitutional violation in ques-
tion.137
Moreover, even where a defendant has standing to object to the prosecu-
tion’s use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the exclusionary rule 
does not automatically bar the evidence.138  Suppression of evidence is 
costly—it may result in the freeing of guilty and dangerous criminals, and 
the waste of government resources (both police officer time and state 
funds).139  Therefore, the Supreme Court requires that suppression of evi-
130. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. 
 131. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960). 
 132. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (finding that the exclusionary 
rule serves the purpose “of assuring the people—all potential victims of unlawful govern-
ment conduct—that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus mini-
mizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government”). 
 133. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 513. 
 134. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (“Have the appellants alleged such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination 
of difficult constitutional questions?  This is the gist of the question of standing.”). 
 135. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 513. 
 136. Criminal defendants do not have automatic standing to contest violations of third-
party constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 (1978) (finding that 
the defendants did not have standing because they “were not persons aggrieved by the un-
lawful search and seizure”) (internal quotations omitted). 
137. See infra notes 153-79 and accompanying text. 
 138. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (“We have never suggested that 
the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal 
deterrence.”). 
139. Id. (“The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly 
dangerous defendants go free . . . the rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforce-
ment objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.”). 
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dence be justified by deterrent benefits and will not suppress tainted evi-
dence where the benefits are unclear.140  In other words, “the benefits of 
deterrence must outweigh the costs.”141  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Herring: “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be suffi-
ciently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently 
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice sys-
tem.”142
The remainder of this section will detail the various exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule and will reveal a great disparity in the strength of the rule 
in its application to due process violations as compared with applications in 
self-incrimination and search and seizure violations.  The exclusionary 
rule’s application to due process violations is simple: there are no excep-
tions.143  If the court finds that the police have coerced a suspect to invo-
luntarily confess, these statements will be barred from use at the defen-
dant’s trial.144  In comparison, the exclusionary rule’s application to self-
incrimination and reasonable search and seizure violations has various ex-
ceptions where the Supreme Court has allowed the prosecution’s use of 
tainted evidence in the defendant’s trial.145  This comparison is doctrinally 
important, as I argue in Part III that the difference in the application of the 
exclusionary rule reveals that the Supreme Court believes coercive police 
conduct (i.e., due process violations) to be more problematic, and more 
worthy of protection than other constitutional guarantees; the Court also 
believes that the benefit of deterring police misconduct (via suppression of 
a confession) unequivocally outweighs the costs of due process violations 
(a defendant being coerced).  Moreover, if due process rights require spe-
cial protection, as the current state of the exclusionary rule suggests, it fol-
lows that the Supreme Court should extend the exclusionary rule of due 
process to ban the use of coerced witness testimony, regardless of its relia-
bility, to further accomplish its goal of deterring police coercion.146
140. Id. at 700 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where 
it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’”) (citations omitted). 
141. Id.
142. Id. at 702. 
143. See infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text. 
144. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
145. See infra notes 153-179 and accompanying text. 
146. See infra Part III.C. 
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1. The Due Process Exclusionary Rule 
A criminal defendant has standing to object to the introduction of his 
own involuntary out-of-court statement.147  The exclusionary rule forbids 
the prosecution’s use of involuntary confessions in the trial.148  There are 
no exceptions to this rule.149  Failure to exclude tainted evidence requires 
reversal.150
Nevertheless, the law is unsettled as to whether a criminal defendant has 
standing to object to the introduction of a coerced, out-of-court statement 
made by a third-party.151  In jurisdictions that allow the use of coerced third 
party statements, the police can improperly induce a third party witness to 
incriminate the defendant and later avoid constitutional challenges to the 
introduction of that evidence in-court.152
2. The Self-Incrimination Exclusionary Rule 
When the Fifth Amendment right of an individual to be free from gov-
ernment compulsion is violated, the exclusionary rule limits the admissibil-
ity of the resulting statements at trial.153  Like due process, the privilege of 
self-incrimination is a personal right, and standing therefore is limited to 
the individual whose Fifth Amendment rights were violated.154  However, 
unlike the due process exclusionary rule, statements made after a Fifth 
Amendment violation are not absolutely barred from use against the defen-
dant in his trial.  Rather, there are several exceptions.155
 147. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (“[E]ven though there may have been 
sufficient evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, 
the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment 
because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
148. Id.
 149. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 402 (1978) (“Due process of law requires that 
[involuntary] statements obtained as these were [coercively] cannot be used in any way
against a defendant at his trial.”) (emphasis added).  In Mincey, the statements made by the 
defendant while he was in the hospital, seriously injured, “encumbered by tubes, needles, 
and breathing apparatus,” were involuntary and inadmissible in his trial for any reason, but 
specifically not for impeachment purposes. Id. at 399. 
150. Id.; Payne, 356 U.S. at 561 (finding that the error of admitting a coerced confession 
into a defendant’s trial requires reversal).  In Payne, the Court reversed a conviction where 
the trial court wrongfully admitted an involuntary confession into evidence.
151. See infra note 186. 
152. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 154. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (“[T]he privilege against self-
incrimination ‘is solely for the benefit of the witness,’ and ‘is purely a personal privilege of 
the witness.’”) (citations omitted). 
155. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text. 
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First, the illegally obtained confession may be used to impeach the de-
fendant if he takes the stand and testifies inconsistently with the previous 
confession.156  Moreover, the use of pre-arrest silence is allowed to im-
peach a defendant claiming self-defense.157  Second, a confession that vi-
olates the Fifth Amendment may be used against a defendant for any pur-
pose where police questioning is reasonably prompted by a concern for 
public safety.158
Some fruits of Miranda-defective confessions are similarly admissible in 
the defendant’s trial, even though the confession itself is not.  Admissible 
“fruits” include: (1) the testimony of a witness who was identified in the 
Miranda-deficient confession;159 (2) the physical fruits of a Miranda-
deficient confession;160 and (3) a second confession (that is voluntary) re-
sulting from a Miranda-defective confession.161
 156. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).  In Harris, the defendant was 
charged with selling heroin to an undercover police officer, and he took the stand in his own 
defense. Id. at 223.  On cross-examination, he was asked if he had made statements to the 
police immediately after his arrest that partially contradicted his direct testimony. Id.  The 
statements were not admissible as substantive evidence because they were Miranda defec-
tive, but the Court held that they could be admitted for purposes of impeaching his credibili-
ty. Id. at 225-26. 
 157. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232 (1980).  In Jenkins, Defendant stabbed and 
killed a man, and at his trial for murder he contended that the killing was in self-defense. Id.
Defendant turned himself in two weeks after the killing. Id.  On cross-examination, and in 
closing arguments, the prosecutor was allowed to bring up the defendant’s two week waiting 
period as inconsistent with his self-defense claim. Id. at 235-40.
 158. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (finding that a Miranda-deficient
statement was admissible at trial because the officer’s failure to issue Miranda warnings 
was justified with “overriding considerations of public safety”—namely, the officers knew 
that the suspect had a gun on his person, and it was immediately necessary to ascertain the 
whereabouts of the gun). 
 159. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (suppressing the defendant’s confession 
when, prior to receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant confessed to committing rape and 
indicated that he was with his friend at the time of the crime, but finding that the friend’s 
testimony was not suppressed because there was “no reason to believe that [the friend’s] 
testimony [was] untrustworthy simply because [defendant] was not” Mirandized). 
 160. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).  In Patane, one police office arrested 
the defendant for allegedly violating a restraining order, while a second police officer at-
tempted to inform the defendant of his Miranda rights. Id. at 634-35.  Before the officer was 
able to complete the Miranda warnings, the defendant interrupted, asserting that he knew 
his rights. Id. at 635.  Neither officer attempted to complete the Miranda warnings, and 
eventually the defendant, a convicted felon, in response to the questioning of one of the of-
ficers, revealed the location of a pistol. Id.  The Court held that “[i]ntroduction of the non-
testimonial fruit of a voluntary statement, such as respondent’s Glock, does not implicate 
the Self-Incrimination Clause.  The admission of such fruit presents no risk that a defen-
dant’s coerced statements, however defined, will be used against him at a criminal trial.” Id.
at 643. 
 161. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).  In Elstad, the defendant confessed to 
burglary, prior to receiving Miranda warnings. Id. at 301.  Later, after Miranda warnings 
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Moreover, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination can be 
waived where the speaker does so with full awareness of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon that right.162
Thus, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not absolute 
and the Supreme Court has found many instances where the cost of sup-
pressing Miranda-deficient evidence—the loss of reliable evidence—
outweighed the benefit of deterring potential police overreaching in the fu-
ture.  Next and last will be a discussion of the reasonable search and seizure 
exclusionary rule.  While a discussion of the reasonable search and seizure 
exclusionary rule may seem removed from that of confession jurispru-
dence, it is helpful to see how the Fourth Amendment constitutional protec-
tion, in comparison to the due process protection, is riddled with excep-
tions. 
3. The Reasonable Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule 
The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is a personal right,163 and when violated, the exclusionary rule lim-
its the admissibility of the evidence at the defendant’s trial.164  The stand-
ing requirements for a Fourth Amendment claim are: (1) the person chal-
lenging the search must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the place searched or a possessory interest in the thing seized; and, (2) the 
person must demonstrate that this subjective expectation is one that society 
accepts as reasonable.165
were properly administered, the defendant again confessed to the crime in writing. Id. at 
302.  The Supreme Court found that it was correct to suppress the first confession, but not 
the second written confession. Id. at 314.  There were no “deliberately coercive or improper 
tactics” accompanying the initial Miranda violation, and thus a subsequent administration of 
the warnings was held to “cure” any lingering compulsion from the first interrogation. Id. at 
310-11, 314.  There are two circumstances in which a second confession must be excluded 
even though the officers properly gave Miranda warnings before the second confession: (1) 
where the first confession is actually involuntary; or, (2) where the second confession is it-
self involuntary as this would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text. 
 162. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (“Miranda holds that ‘[the] defendant 
may waive effectuation’ of the rights conveyed in the warnings ‘provided the waiver is 
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.’”) (citations omitted); see also supra notes 
118-119 and accompanying text. 
 163. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are per-
sonal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”) 
(quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)).
164. Id. at 134 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
165. Id. at 143 n.12. 
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The standing requirement allows a defendant to object to the use of evi-
dence obtained in the course of an illegal search of or seizure from a third-
party in three instances.  The defendant has standing if: (1) he is the owner 
of a car illegally searched or seized, even if he is not present at the time of 
the search and seizure;166 (2) he had permission from the owner to use the 
property illegally searched or seized;167 or, (3) he is an overnight guest in 
the premises illegally searched or seized.168  A defendant has standing in 
these situations because of a held expectation of privacy in the areas 
searched and seized—either based on ownership, or permission from the 
owner.169  Aside from these three exceptions, a defendant does not have 
standing.  Thus, if the police violate a third-party’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, the resulting evidence can be used in the prosecution of the defen-
dant.170  In fact, in United States v. Payner, the Supreme Court made clear 
that if the standing requirement is not met, courts may not use their super-
visory power to exclude evidence, even in the face of blatant and intention-
al Fourth Amendment violations.171
Once the defendant has successfully established standing, the exclusion 
of the evidence obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is 
 166. United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that an absentee 
owner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his truck even when the truck was being 
driven by an employee).  In Jenkins, the owner of the truck was found to have standing to 
object to the use of evidence obtained during an illegal search of the truck that was con-
ducted when the owner was not present. Id. at 435. 
 167. United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1273-75 (10th Cir. 1990).  In Rubio-
Rivera, the defendant was directed to a secondary checkpoint after his initial border stop, 
where he consented to a vehicle search. Id. at 1273-74.  Defendant was not the owner of the 
vehicle searched, but he had obtained the car from someone in Mexico who had given him 
permission to drive the car and was in possession of the registration papers. Id. at 1274-75.  
The court found that the defendant offered sufficient evidence that he had permission of the 
owner to use the vehicle, and thus, plainly had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle and standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 1275. 
 168. Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (holding that a person’s “status as an 
overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”).  In Olsen, the Court affirmed the re-
versal of defendant’s conviction on the grounds that he was arrested without a warrant, in 
violation of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, in a home in which he was an 
overnight guest. Id. at 96-97, 100. 
169. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text. 
 170. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (“[A] court may not exclude evi-
dence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure vi-
olated the defendant’s own constitutional rights.”) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
138 (1978)). 
171. Id. at 733.  In Payner, IRS agents investigating the defendant, Payner, stole the 
briefcase of another person and photocopied hundreds of documents that were entered into 
evidence against Payner. Id. at 729-30.  The Court found that Payner did not have standing 
to challenge the illegal search and seizure. Id. at 732. 
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warranted in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.172  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has created several exceptions whereby the prosecution may use such 
evidence for “collateral use”: (1) for impeachment;173 (2) in habeas corpus 
proceedings;174 (3) in grand jury proceedings;175 (4) in sentencing hear-
ings;176 (5) in forfeiture proceedings;177 (6) in deportation proceedings;178
(7) in civil tax proceedings;179 and, (8) in parole revocation hearings.180
Because the Fourth Amendment violation occurs at the time of the intru-
sion and not when the resulting evidence is admitted at trial, the Supreme 
Court views the exclusion of reliable evidence as a cost that outweighs the 
deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule. 
The Fourth Amendment also includes additional exceptions for the fruits 
of illegal searches where the evidence obtained is too attenuated from the 
original violation, where the evidence is obtained from an independent 
source, or where discovery of the evidence illegally found would have in-
evitably occurred by legal means.181
In short, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure is qualified by many exceptions where the state can use 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence against a defendant at trial.182  This 
has led the Supreme Court to state that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has 
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”183  This is certainly ac-
curate in the context of Fourth Amendment violations, as the cases devel-
oping the search and seizure exclusionary rule reveal that the Supreme 
Court does not view violations of the Fourth Amendment as “sufficiently 
deliberate” or “sufficiently culpable” to warrant the cost of losing valuable 
evidence.184  In comparison, the cases surrounding the due process exclu-
172. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies in state 
courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule applies in fed-
eral courts). 
 173. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64 (1954). 
 174. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). 
 175. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 176. United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1261 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 177. United States v. $277,000.00 U.S. Currency, 941 F.2d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 178. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
 179. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976). 
 180. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1998). 
 181. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (independent source); Nix v. Wil-
liams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (inevitable discovery); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (attenuation). 
182. See supra notes 163-179 and accompanying text. 
 183. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); see, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 166-67 (1986) (finding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when a person’s 
involuntary statement was not the product of police coercion). 
184. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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sionary rule provide no exceptions where the prosecution may benefit from 
police misconduct—revealing the Supreme Court’s intolerance for police 
coercion.185  This Note will argue that the elevated concern for police coer-
cion demands the conclusion that coerced witness statements must also be 
submitted to an equally strict exclusionary standard in a criminal defen-
dant’s trial on grounds that it would violate his due process rights.  As the 
Supreme Court has yet to rule on this important issue, state, district, and 
circuit courts have come to different results.186  The next section will dis-
cuss cases bearing on the issue of coerced witness testimony and look at 
how these courts have justified their position.187  Some courts have found 
that the use of coerced witness testimony in a defendant’s trial is complete-
ly an evidentiary matter,188 while others hold that it is a constitutional is-
sue.189
II. THE DUE PROCESS DEBATE ON COERCED WITNESS TESTIMONY
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit held in Samuel v. Frank that a defendant 
may not benefit from the exclusionary rule if a witness’s coerced out-of-
court statement is admitted into evidence because his constitutional rights 
are not violated.190  On the other hand, other courts that have considered 
the same issue, find the exact opposite: the use of coerced witness testimo-
ny in the defendant’s trial indeed violates that defendant’s constitutional 
rights and thus must be excluded.191
In Samuel v. Frank, police coerced Tisha Leyh, a sixteen-year-old moth-
er, into incriminating the defendant by threatening her with losing custody 
of her two-day-old infant.192  In 1996, Tisha was kicked out of her mother’s 
home193 and subsequently left Wisconsin with Stanley Samuel, the forty-
seven year old defendant.194  The pair was tracked down thirteen months 
later in Illinois, where Samuel was arrested and extradited to Wisconsin, 
185. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. 
 186. Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Samuel II] (“The 
Supreme Court has not decided whether the admission of a coerced third-party statement is 
unconstitutional . . . .”). 
187. See infra notes 190-256 and accompanying text. 
188. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
189. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
190. Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 566; see also infra notes 192-206 for a complete discussion 
of the facts in Samuel II.
191. See infra notes 226-256 and accompanying text. 
192. Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 566, 567-68; Samuel v. Frank, No. 03-C-1279, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 91796, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Samuel I].
 193. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Samuel II, 525 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 03-
C-1279).
194. Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 567. 
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while Tisha’s father picked her up.195  Just one day after their return, on 
March 10, 1997, Tisha gave birth.196  The State pressed charges against 
Samuel for sexual assault, and “critical to the charge . . . was whether the 
pair had sex in Wisconsin before they left the state . . . .”197  The State 
lacked sufficient physical evidence, and thus needed the cooperation of ei-
ther Samuel or Tisha.198
On March 12, 1997, just two days after giving birth, social workers and 
police officers held a conference with Tisha and her father to determine 
custody of the baby.199  Despite their stated purpose of determining custody 
of the child, police asked Tisha questions about her sex life with Samuel, 
and her whereabouts over the past year.200  Tisha, her father, and her law-
yer later testified that during the conference it was indicated that the infant 
would be removed from Tisha’s custody unless she cooperated by giving 
statements to the police.201  Tisha did not incriminate the defendant, and it 
was decided at the end of the conference to immediately place the child in-
to foster care.202  The following day, Tisha went to the police station and 
made several statements that were later used in the prosecution of defen-
dant.203  On March 14, 1997, Tisha’s baby was taken from foster care, and 
placed in Tisha’s custody.204
At a pretrial suppression hearing, and again at trial, Tisha recanted her 
statements implicating the defendant, and asserted that she made them out 
of fear of losing custody of her newborn child.205  Nevertheless, these 
statements were admitted into evidence against Samuel.206
195. Samuel I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91796, at *2. 
196. Id.
197. Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 567. 
198. See id.
199. Id.
 200. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 193, at 4. 
201. Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 568 (“Tisha testified that at the first conference she had been 
told that if she didn’t cooperate she wouldn’t get her baby back, and that she understood this 
to mean that she had to give statements to the police.  Her father testified that at that confe-
rence the police officers had gotten angry with Tisha because she refused to tell them where 
she’d been with the defendant or give them the addresses of the people they had stayed with.  
Her lawyer testified that the impression created at the conference was that unless Tisha gave 
a full statement concerning the defendant’s conduct, she would not get the baby back.”). 
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
 206. Samuel was convicted by a jury of second-degree sexual assault of a child, interfe-
rence with child custody, and abduction, and sentenced to thirty-eight years in prison, fol-
lowed by sixteen years on probation. Id. at 567-68.  Samuel exhausted his state appeals. See
State v. Samuel, 643 N.W.2d 423 (Wis. 2002).  Samuel also petitioned for federal habeas 
corpus relief, lost, and appealed. See Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 567. 
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The Samuel court first looked at the egregiousness of the police conduct, 
acknowledging that the officers at the initial conference indeed created an 
impression that Tisha had to cooperate in the investigation of Samuel or 
suffer the consequence of losing custody of her child.207  Nevertheless, the 
court declined to find that this behavior equated to a finding that Tisha’s 
statements were in fact coerced.208  Rather, the police conduct during the 
initial conference with Tisha was found to be legitimate, even though po-
lice and social workers “would be forcing her to choose between losing the 
baby and incriminating” Samuel.209  The court reasoned that Tisha’s failure 
to cooperate with police could be a valid reason to doubt her competency as 
a mother.210  The court suggested that non-cooperation with police would 
be one factor among others that would be evaluated in determining the 
competency of a mother.211  That said, the day after Tisha cooperated with 
the police investigation of Samuel, she was given custody of her child.212
The court explicitly distinguished the facts of Samuel from a situation 
where the police threatened a mother “with denial of custody of the baby 
because she refused to incriminate the father.”213  That situation, the court 
announced, would render Tisha’s statements inadmissible,214 because “tak-
ing away a person’s child . . . [is] not considered [a] proper method . . . of 
obtaining evidence against criminals.”215  The police conduct complained 
of was not, in fact, found to be coercive. 
After evaluating the police conduct and concluding that Tisha’s constitu-
tional rights had not been violated, the court nevertheless went on to dis-
cuss the appropriate treatment of coerced statements of non-defendants un-
207. Samuel II, 525 F.3d at 568 (“The officers may have created the impression that un-
less she [Tisha] cooperated in their investigation of the defendant they would make sure she 
did not get her baby back.”). 
208. Id. (“A failure to cooperate with police could be a proper reason for doubting a ru-
naway teenage single mother’s competence to be given custody of her child . . . .”). 
209. Id.
210. Id. (“Had the child-welfare authorities believed that her failure to answer questions 
about her pregnancy during her months on the run counted against giving her custody of her 
baby, they could tell her that.”).  The court suggested that non-cooperation with police 
would be one factor among others that would be evaluated in determining the competency 
of a mother. Id. (“Tisha had not sought prenatal care or given other signs of taking responsi-
bilities of motherhood seriously.”).  That said, the day after Tisha cooperated with the police 
investigation of Samuel, she was given custody of her child. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (emphasis added). 
214. Id.  That situation, the court noted, was akin to “threatening a person with torture if 
he refused to ’fess up.” Id.
215. Id.
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der the Constitution, as it related to the defendant.216  The court considered 
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to coerced statements in general, 
and pronounced that the Seventh Circuit “do[es] not think that there is an 
exclusionary rule . . . applicable to third-party statements.”217  Neverthe-
less, the court limited its evaluation of the exclusionary rule to Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination violations and did not consider its applica-
bility to due process violations.218
The court also rejected the argument that the coerced third-party state-
ment be constitutionally excluded on the ground that it was unreliable be-
cause “[n]ot all evidence routinely allowed in trials is particularly relia-
ble,”219 and found such evidence to be reliable enough, especially where 
corroborated.220  To support this, the court cites to several cases where cor-
roboration cured the unconstitutionally obtained evidence; however, in so 
doing, the court refers to cases in which the police had either not violated a 
constitutional right of the defendant, or where a constitutional right other 
than due process was at issue.221
After refusing to exclude Tisha’s statements on constitutional grounds, 
the court stated in dicta that evidentiary concerns would require that it “re-
verse a conviction if it rested entirely on a coerced statement that was com-
pletely unreliable.”222  Ultimately, the court pointed to corroborating evi-
dence that supported Tisha’s coerced statements and did not reverse.223
Thus by targeting Tisha rather than the defendant, the prosecution was able 
to benefit from the use of coercive techniques to abstract the information  
216. Id. at 569. 
217. Id.  Moreover, the court noted that there is “no rule or principle that evidence ob-
tained by improper means may not be used in a legal proceeding.” Id. at 570. 
218. Id. at 570 (“[T]he concern with coerced statements is a concern with confessions or 
other self-incriminating statements, rather than with the coercion itself.”) (citation omitted). 
219. Id.
220. Id. at 570-71 (“[T]he reliability of a single item of evidence often depends on other 
evidence, rather than being assessable in isolation. This is true of coerced statements.  Not 
all are unreliable; their reliability may be established by corroboration . . . .”). 
221. Id. at 571 (finding no constitutional violation of the defendant, thus the exclusionary 
rule was inapplicable (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation of the defendant, thus 
remanding the case with direction to invoke the exclusionary rule to exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (finding a Sixth Amendment 
violation of the defendant, thus remanding the case with direction to invoke the exclusionary 
rule to exclude illegally obtained evidence)). 
222. Id. at 569 (“For in such a case no reasonable judge or jury could find that the defen-
dant’s guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and hence the conviction would 
have deprived him of liberty without due process of law.”). 
223. Id. at 571. 
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needed for the defendant’s conviction, without having to face what would 
otherwise be constitutionally-mandated suppression.224
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit faced a similar situation to Samuel when it 
decided United States v. Gonzales.225  In Gonzales, police allegedly 
coerced a key witness and the resulting information was used against the 
defendants at trial.226  Despite the similarities of the cases, the court set a 
starkly different precedent from the Seventh Circuit, holding that a defen-
dant’s due process rights are violated when the government coerces a wit-
ness to make false statements and uses those statements at trial.227  In justi-
fying this approach the court relied on the framework set out in Clanton v. 
Cooper, which addressed a similar issue of whether a defendant’s right to 
due process of law was violated by the use of coerced witness testimony in 
an arrest warrant.228  In Clanton, Carolyn Clanton was arrested and de-
tained for arson pursuant to an arrest warrant.229  The arrest warrant was 
based largely on the uncorroborated statements of Clanton’s nephew, Mi-
chael Eaves, made in the course of his own confession.230  Eaves later re-
canted his statements, asserting that the confession was false and the police 
coerced him into making the statement by falsely telling him that they had 
physical evidence linking Eaves to the crime, threatening to send him to jail 
for twenty-five years unless he confessed, and suggesting that Eaves would 
“get off lightly” if he confessed.231  The court found that a promise of le-
niency, coupled with lies about incriminating evidence, indeed made the 
224. Id.
 225. 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1999). 
226. Id. at 1289.  In Gonzales, an arrest warrant was issued for an individual (the “Wit-
ness”) who was allegedly a key witness to a murder that defendants were charged with, and 
further, the Witness was acquainted with the structure and organization of the Sureno 13 
gang, to which the defendants belonged. Id. at 1287.  The arrest warrant contained an “es-
cape clause” that asserted the Witness would be arrested and held in detention unless she 
“cooperates fully, and truthfully and accurately and completely reveals” to the government 
her information and involvement in the crimes. Id.  The district court found that the Wit-
ness’s subsequent testimony was involuntary because the warrant “was blatantly tailored to 
obtain information and testimony” from the Witness because she “could escape arrest [only] 
if she divulged everything she knew about the Garcia homicide.” Id. at 1289 (internal cita-
tion omitted).  However, on appeal the court disagreed, and found the subsequent statements 
voluntary. Id. at 1291.  Relevant here, is that the court addressed the proper treatment of 
coerced witness testimony. Id.
227. Id. at 1289 (“[D]efendants’ due process rights would be implicated if the subject 
witness was coerced into making false statements and those statements were admitted 
against defendants at trial.”). 
228. Id. at 1289-91 (citing Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
229. Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1151. 
230. Id. at 1157. 
231. Id. at 1152, 1157.  Subsequently, Eaves signed a Miranda waiver form and gave a 
tape-recorded oral statement in which he confessed to the arson and implicated Clanton. Id.
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Eaves confession involuntary under the totality of circumstances.232  Thus, 
Clanton argued that her constitutional right to due process of law had been 
violated when the police coerced statements from Eaves, and used them 
against her.233
The court agreed with Clanton, reasoning that she had standing to object 
to the use of Eaves’ coerced testimony based on a violation of her own 
constitutional right to due process of law.234  The court stated that the ex-
clusionary rule protects the legitimacy of the Constitution itself, and exclu-
sion is needed because of the danger of unreliable evidence, and because of 
a sense of fundamental unfairness best expressed as the “deep-rooted feel-
ing that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”235  Clanton 
thus had standing because Eaves’ confession was found to be involunta-
ry.236  Importantly, the court found that the concerns justifying the exclu-
sion of coerced defendant statements are of similar importance when a wit-
ness is coerced: offensive police measures are no less offensive when 
exerted against a witness, rather than a defendant, and the resulting evi-
dence is no less unreliable when spoken by a coerced witness than a 
coerced defendant.237  The court emphasized that the government’s treat-
ment of Eaves was at odds with the principles of the Constitution, and 
would not be ignored so that the government could bolster its case against 
Clanton.238  While Clanton’s holding was limited to the defendant’s right to 
232. Id. at 1159 (“[T]he totality of the circumstances surrounding Eaves’ interrogation 
gives rise to an atmosphere which to this Court’s conclusion that any statements arising 
from these circumstances cannot be said to be ‘freely self-determined’ or of ‘free will.’”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
233. Id. at 1157. 
234. Id. at 1158 (“Clanton may contest the voluntariness of Eaves’s confession not based 
on any violation of his constitutional rights, but rather as a violation of her own Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process.”) (formatting omitted). 
235. Id. at 1157 (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is warranted because of: “[T]he 
strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an 
agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of 
an accused against his will . . . that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered 
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual crimi-
nals themselves.” (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
236. Id. at 1157-58 (“Clanton has standing to contest the voluntariness of Eaves’s [sic] 
confession.”). 
237. Id. at 1158 (“Confessions wrung out of their makers may be less reliable than volun-
tary confessions, so that using one person’s coerced confession at another’s trial violates his 
rights under the due process clause. . . . Further, it is unthinkable that a statement obtained 
by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state should be admitted at the 
government’s behest in order to bolster its case. . . . Yet methods offensive when used 
against an accused do not magically become any less so when exerted against a witness.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
238. Id.
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object to the use of coerced witness testimony in an arrest warrant,239 Gon-
zales represents its expansion to a defendant’s trial.240
The Gonzales-Clanton approach has been adopted in various state and 
federal courts, and grants a defendant standing to object to the use of 
coerced witness testimony on the basis of a violation of the defendant’s 
personal due process rights.241  Standing has, on occasion, even been ex-
panded to allow defendants to object to the use of coerced statements for 
impeachment purposes,242 and to the admission of an involuntary confes-
sion of a co-defendant.243  These courts exclude coerced witness testimony, 
239. Id. But see United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1306 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that evidence may be excluded if it was obtained in violation of a non-defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right, but does not extend to cover allegations of violations of a non-
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 
1986) (finding that statements made by a witness to the government are not “involuntary” 
and thus excludable on grounds of due process merely because the government violated the 
attorney-client privilege in talking to the witness). 
240. United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1999). 
241. See, e.g., Valdez v. McKune, 266 Fed. App’x 735, 739 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
“a defendant may assert that his right to a fair trial has been violated by the use of testimony 
that has been unlawfully compelled from government witnesses” but declining to find a due 
process violation because the facts did not support that the witness was improperly coerced); 
United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (acknowl-
edging that defendant had standing to contest the use of coerced testimony, but the court 
denied that the witness statements were involuntary where “federal agents contacted [the 
witness] ‘continuously’ and told him if he did not cooperate ‘he would be facing 25 to 40 
years in jail . . . but that they would go easy on him if he ‘cooperated’’”); LaFrance v. Boh-
linger, 499 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding that the Due Process Clause “protects the 
accused against pretrial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of its exploitation 
of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its part,” including situations where the 
government coerces a third-party); Bradford v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 1331, 1336-38 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972) (defendant had standing to object to the use of coerced witness testimony on 
due process grounds).  In Bradford, the witness had been tortured by law enforcement offi-
cials to obtain his own confession and coerce him to name the defendant as his accomplice. 
Bradford, 354 F. Supp. at 1332-34.  The witness had attempted to recant but had again been 
tortured. Id. at 1337.  He was still in the custody of the abusive officers at the time that he 
testified in court against petitioner. Id.  The court held that the use of testimony obtained by 
torture of a witness violated defendant’s right to due process. Id. at 1338; see also Raphael 
v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Alaska 2000) (citations omitted) (“[T]he subsequent use of 
her testimony against [defendant], if coerced, would violate [defendant’s] due process.”); 
People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 500 (1990) (“[T]he exclusion is based on the idea that 
coerced testimony is inherently unreliable, and that its admission therefore violates defen-
dant’s right to a fair trial.”). 
242. See Valdez, 266 Fed. App’x at 739 (forbidding the use of coerced testimony as evi-
dence against the criminal defendant); LaFrance, 499 F.2d at 39 (forbidding the use of 
coerced testimony against the criminal defendant for impeachment purposes). 
 243. United States v. Miller, 250 F.R.D. 588, 597 (D. Kan. 2008) (holding that co-
defendants had standing to challenge the voluntariness of co-defendant-Ross’s confession, 
not based on a violation of Ross’s constitutional rights, but on the basis of a violation of 
their own right to due process). 
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much like coerced defendant testimony, because of the unreliability of the 
coerced testimony, and because the underlying police misconduct offends 
society’s sense of fairness.244
Some courts adhering to a Gonzales-Clanton-like approach hold that the 
defendant’s due process rights are violated only if the coerced testimony is 
unreliable or false, and will not exclude coerced testimony if it is strongly 
corroborated, or if the coerced testimony is on the basis of police miscon-
duct alone.245  In these courts, the police coercion will be inconsequential 
if, for instance, a witness is coerced by police to implicate the defendant 
but later voluntarily testifies at trial.246  To find that in-court testimony is 
not tainted by the prior coercion, the court looks at several factors including 
how much time elapsed between the illegal interrogation and the trial tes-
timony,247 whether any intervening circumstances insulated the testimony 
from the effect of the prior coercion,248 whether the coerced statements and 
in-court testimony were substantially consistent,249 whether the statements 
244. Valdez, 266 Fed. App’x at 739; LaFrance, 499 F.2d at 35; Raphael, 994 P.2d at 
1008.
 245. United States v. Hodges, No. 99-3083, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5030, at *3-4 (10th 
Cir. Mar. 24, 2000) (holding that the defendant had standing to object to the coerced testi-
mony of the government’s witness).  In Hodges, the witness testified at trial that once she 
and the defendant realized they were being pulled over, the defendant passed drugs to her to 
hide on her person. Id. at *2-3.  Defendant argued that the officers coerced this testimony 
from the witness. Id. at *3.  The court held that, even if the witness’s testimony was coerced, 
any unreliability was overcome by the officers’ corroboration. Id. at *4; see also Gonzales,
164 F.3d at 1287 (“[D]efendants’ due process rights would be implicated if the subject wit-
ness was coerced into making false statements and those statements were admitted against 
defendants at trial.”); United States v. McCuiston, No. 06-40071-01-SAC, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11038, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2007) (“A defendant’s right to due process is impli-
cated when a witness is coerced into making a false statement and the false statement is ad-
mitted at trial.”). 
246. See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 594 (9th Cir. 2002) (“By the time of trial, 
the psychologically coercive atmosphere of that interrogation must surely have dissipated.  
There [was] no indication that [the witness] was told at any time by anyone what he should 
say on the witness stand.  We also noted that the witness was subject to cross-examination, 
through which the appellant brought out the facts of the interrogation and the inducement to 
testify, and that the jury was free to observe the witness’s demeanor and gauge his credibili-
ty.  Because the alleged facts of coercive interrogation and inducement to testify did not 
support a conclusion that the witness’s trial testimony was involuntary, we denied the appel-
lant’s due process claim.”) (quoting United States v. Mattison, 437 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
247. See id. at 595 (finding that two years was sufficient to cure atmosphere of coercion). 
248. See id. (finding that the coerced witness testimony was cured when he testified at 
trial because two years had passed, and by the time of trial, the witness was represented by 
counsel).
249. See United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Although there ap-
pear to be some factual inconsistencies between the [witnesses’] out-of-court statements . . . 
and the [witnesses’] subsequent in-court testimony, Merkt points to no substantial contradic-
tions between the two recitations.”). 
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are unreliable or untrue, and whether the witnesses would have testified on 
the defendant’s behalf had their statements not been adduced by the prose-
cution’s case.250  The fact that in-court testimony is subject to cross-
examination, allowing juries to make a credibility determinations, is also a 
factor that courts weigh deciding whether to admit coerced witness state-
ments.251
Other courts, following a Gonzales-Clanton approach, frame this issue 
as whether the government’s investigation methods resulted in a fundamen-
tally unfair trial, so as to violate the defendant’s right to due process.252  In 
substance, however, the analysis does not differ: courts look at the police 
misconduct, and the veracity of the coerced statements.253  If the coerced 
statements are corroborated with in-court testimony, the right to due 
process of law—specifically, the right to a fair trial—is not violated.254  In 
Merkt, for example, the court held that while the defendant’s due process 
rights had been violated by the admission of coerced witness statements, 
this violation was cured by subsequent in-court testimony that was consis-
tent with those statements, thus finding the defendant had been granted a 
fair trial.255  Moreover, a deprivation of a fair trial requires that the coerced 
testimony actually be admitted into evidence, or that the witness’s in-court 
testimony has been tainted by the prior coercion.256
250. Id. (finding it relevant to the issue of a fundamentally fair trial that the defendant did 
not claim that the witnesses would have testified on her behalf had they not been coerced by 
the government). 
251. Williams, 384 F.3d at 594. 
 252. Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the de-
fendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial because while one of the State’s wit-
nesses was coerced to implicate the defendant through repeated physical beatings, none of 
the resulting statements were actually admitted into evidence against him); Merkt, 764 F.2d 
at 274 (finding that the defendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial because the 
coerced witnesses’ in-court testimony was voluntary, and substantially consistent with the 
statements made under coercion); United States v. Chivola, 744 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the government’s investigation methods did not result in a fundamentally un-
fair trial because the co-conspirator was not coerced by police to implicate the defendant, 
but rather, the co-conspirator was merely instructed to call a certain phone number which 
the defendant picked up). 
253. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 274. 
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1093 (finding no taint of coercion in witness’s in-court testi-
mony where witness himself admitted that the coercive nature of the interrogation had 
changed and he was simply told to tell the truth on the witness stand). 
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III. WITNESS COERCION IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL—A CONSTITUTIONAL 
WRONG
This Note has detailed the history of confession jurisprudence in the 
United States and highlighted an issue not yet addressed by the Supreme 
Court—whether the use of a coerced witness statement in a criminal trial 
violates the defendant’s right to due process.  A vast discrepancy exists 
among circuit, district, and state courts in how to handle this important is-
sue.257
Some courts follow the Samuel v. Frank approach, which held that a 
criminal defendant has no constitutional right to contest the use of involun-
tary witness statements at his trial.258  Other courts follow an approach 
more akin to that of Gonzales-Clanton, providing that a criminal defendant 
indeed has standing to object to the use of unreliable, coerced witness 
statements as evidence, on the grounds that if admitted, the defendant’s 
constitutional right to due process of law would be violated.259  There is no 
national consensus, however, as to what the Constitution demands.  Cer-
tainly, the adoption of either approach by the Supreme Court would cure 
the most urgent issue: that a criminal defendant’s right to due process va-
ries depending on the jurisdiction of prosecution.  Nevertheless, this Note 
argues that the Supreme Court should read the Constitution so that: (1) 
criminal defendants have standing to contest admission of coerced witness 
testimony; and (2) all coerced statements of a witness will be excluded, re-
gardless of their reliability.  This method will best uphold the policy of the 
exclusionary rule: to deter police misconduct and protect the constitutional 
due process rights of criminal defendants. 
A. Exclusion of All Coerced Witness Statements Regardless of 
Reliability
While there is no consensus on whether admitting coerced witness testi-
mony in a defendant’s trial violates his due process rights, one issue that 
nearly all courts address in this context is the reliability of the statements in 
question.  In fact, it seems that reliability is the common denominator of all 
the approaches taken in regard to coerced witness testimony: all courts 
would reverse a conviction that rested entirely on an unreliable coerced 
statement.260  Some courts justify suppression of coerced witness testimony 
257. See supra notes 192-206, 226-256 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 227, 241 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 219-222, 237 and accompanying text. 
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on evidentiary concerns,261 while other courts rely on constitutional 
grounds.262  The bottom line, however, is that the reliability of the coerced 
statements dictates how coerced witness testimony is treated in court.  
Moreover, while the Supreme Court rejects the notion that unreliability is a 
proper ground to exclude involuntary confessions made by a defendant,263 I 
argue that the voluntary standard which controls due process analysis is in 
fact looking to the reliability of the statements, albeit indirectly.  Further-
more, I argue that because reliability of statements is of great concern in 
due process analysis, all statements produced by police coercion (from a 
defendant or witness) should be banned from use at a defendant’s trial, not 
because they are in fact unreliable, but rather because they are inherently
unreliable.264  Banning the use of all inherently unreliable statements pro-
vides courts with a bright line rule in cases of police coercion that is easy to 
implement, and importantly, accomplishes the Supreme Court’s stated pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule: to deter police misconduct adequately and 
efficiently. 
First, the voluntariness requirement is not completely divorced from re-
liability.265  In fact, the voluntariness requirement is a product of the com-
mon law rule of evidence aimed solely at preventing unreliable confessions 
from entering into evidence against a criminal defendant.266  The common 
law assumed that innocent defendants normally have no incentive to sub-
ject themselves to criminal prosecution and detention, so where no alterna-
tive incentives were at play (i.e., coercive pressures), the confession was 
assumed to be true.267  Nevertheless, no such presumption of truthfulness 
was granted where physical or psychological pressure had been exerted on 
 261. In Samuel, the court stated that if a defendant is convicted solely on the basis of un-
reliable information, “no reasonable judge or jury could find that the defendant’s guilt has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” thus he would have been deprived of “liberty 
without due process of law.” Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1979)).  Under this method, the court would al-
low admission of unreliable statements into evidence and permit the jury to make a credi-
bility determination.  If in the appellate court’s opinion, the jury made the wrong credibility 
determination and convicted on grounds where there was indeed reasonable doubt, it would 
reverse the conviction allowing for a new trier of fact to hear the case.  It is at that point, 
post-conviction, that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial has been violated. 
 262. Courts in the Gonzales-Clanton camp would reach the same result as Samuel, but 
more efficiently.  Faced with coerced statements, which are inherently unreliable, the court 
would deny admission into evidence because a conviction based on that statement would 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-34 
(2000).
263. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
266. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
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the confessor because the individual may have been incentivized to confess 
to escape an aversive interrogation, secure a promised benefit, or avoid a 
threatened harm.268  These statements were involuntary and “inherently un-
reliable.”269  For instance, in the Central Park Jogger case, the young boys 
were innocent of the crimes which they were accused of but confessed be-
cause the police made explicit promises that if they confessed, they would 
be treated as witnesses, not suspects.270  In other words, the false promises 
made by police gave the boys an incentive to confess to crimes they did not 
commit, believing that doing so would actually exonerate them.271  The 
boys’ confessions should have seemed suspicious to the court, but were un-
fortunately admitted as voluntary statements.272
The common law rule was adopted by the Supreme Court, and Brown v. 
Mississippi made the voluntariness requirement the touchstone of the con-
stitutional right to due process.273 Brown specifically cites to the unrelia-
bility of the defendant’s confession as a primary concern of due process vi-
olations.274  The Court’s rationale was that involuntary confessions are 
inherently less trustworthy, thus violating constitutionally protected prin-
ciples of fundamental fairness.275  The Court has since questioned Brown’s 
rationale, as trustworthiness proved not to be the exclusive policy underly-
ing due process concern.276  Nevertheless, in Colorado v. Connelly, the 
Court’s most direct attack on reliability, the due process violation com-
plaint involved no police overreaching, and thus was factually different 
from other due process violations.277  In Connelly, the defendant was com-
pelled by God to speak, and not by police coercion.278 Connelly permitted 
the use of the defendant’s statement in light of the fact that no police coer-
cion had been at play, and made clear that the reliability of the statements 
were of no importance.279  Admittedly, it can be argued that statements 
made by a mentally insane person, as in Connelly, are equally as unreliable 
as statements made by a person under coercive pressure from the police.  
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, only covers state action, and thus 
268. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. 
272. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra note 71. 
277. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 88.
279. See supra note 89.
SHERIDAN_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011 7:03 PM 
2011] EXCLUDING COERCED WITNESS TESTIMONY 1259 
the lack of police coercion in Connelly is critically important.280  Moreover, 
since Connelly, reliability remains in the consciousness of judges making 
voluntariness determinations.  Clanton v. Cooper is case-in-point.  The 
court found that “[c]onfessions wrung out of their makers may be less reli-
able than voluntary confessions” and that use of such statements in a crimi-
nal trial violates due process of law.281  Thus, even where the Supreme 
Court purports to ignore reliability concerns, it can never divorce them 
from the voluntary requirement of due process. 
Second, because the reliability of a defendant’s confession is of implicit 
importance in due process analysis, the reliability of a coerced witness 
statement should also be accounted for, as a coerced witness is even more 
unreliable than a coerced defendant.  While a criminal defendant has every 
incentive to withstand police coercion and avoid falsely incriminating him-
self, a witness has no obvious reasons to endure third-degree police tactics.  
Therefore, when a witness is faced with coercive pressures to make a 
statement against another person, he must balance the harm of the coercion 
with telling the police what they want.  It is not surprising that the balance 
falls on the side of telling the police the information they demand, regard-
less of whether or not it is true.  So while a coerced confession is “inherent-
ly untrustworthy,” coerced statements made by witnesses who have essen-
tially no incentive to be honest are even more so.  Thus, where courts 
justify exclusion of confessions made by a defendant on the basis of unre-
liability, and even when they do not do so explicitly, they should also ex-
clude coerced witness statements because such statements are likely more
unreliable.
Moreover, in an effort to provide courts with an easily administrable 
test, and to best protect criminal defendants’ due process rights, all state-
ments produced by police coercion (whether from a defendant or witness) 
should be banned from use at a defendant’s trial.  Because all coerced 
statements can be presumed to be inherently unreliable, none should be 
admitted into evidence.  Arguments that this bright line rule may hinder po-
lice investigative efforts are well founded.  I argue, however, that police 
should be held to a higher standard when an individual’s liberty is at stake.  
To truly deter police misconduct in criminal investigations, the state must 
be punished when it produces inherently unreliable evidence by way of 
coercion.
280. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
 281. Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Buckley v. Fitz-
simmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994)); see supra note 237.  For other cases concerning 
“unreliability,” see supra note 245. 
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Lastly, corroboration is not enough to cure due process violations.  If 
corroborating evidence is available, the police should be made to rely on 
that alone.  I disagree with those courts that grant standing to defendants to 
object to the use of coerced witness testimony, but find no due process vi-
olation where the statements are corroborated.  In Brown v. Mississippi, all 
of the defendants were fed specific confessions by their interrogators who 
were familiar with the crime scene.282  It was thus no wonder that the con-
fessions were corroborated by physical evidence.  As this case illustrates, 
corroborating evidence cannot always be trusted, and thus should not be al-
lowed to override the due process concerns in admitting coerced witness 
statements. 
Banning the use of all inherently unreliable statements will adequately 
and efficiently accomplish the stated purpose of the exclusionary rule—
deterring police misconduct. 
B. Voluntariness of a Witness’s Statement is the Correct Standard of 
Due Process 
Whether a due process right of the defendant has been violated by the 
use of a coerced witness testimony at his trial is determined by looking at 
whether the witness’s statements were involuntary.  The voluntariness test 
is the appropriate rubric for analyzing due process violations.  Rather than 
analyzing the confines of the exclusionary rule as the courts in Gonzales
and Clanton did,283 some courts simplified the inquiry of whether the use 
of coerced witness testimony violated the defendant’s due process rights by 
looking to whether the criminal defendant was granted a “fair trial” over-
all.284  This approach oversimplifies the issues presented, relies too heavily 
on a subjective notion of what constitutes a “fair trial,” and unnecessarily 
opens the floodgates to defendants seeking to suppress evidence.  The due 
process inquiry relating to coerced witness testimony must be narrowed so 
that a defendant may object to suppression only when a witness involunta-
rily talks to the police (i.e., under coercion).285  By conceptualizing due 
process under the voluntariness standard, it will limit a defendant’s ability 
to object to anything that seems “unfair.” 
 282. 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936). See supra note 64. 
 283. United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289-92 (10th Cir. 1999); Clanton, 129 
F.3d at 1157-59. 
284. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text. 
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C. Due Process Violations Are a Greater Harm Than Other 
Constitutional Violations in the Criminal Procedure Context 
When evidence is unconstitutionally obtained, the exclusionary rule de-
mands suppression if the underlying police conduct is “sufficiently delibe-
rate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”286  In other 
words, suppression of evidence is warranted when the benefits of deterring 
police misconduct outweigh the cost of potentially freeing a guilty defen-
dant and wasting government resources.287  In the context of due process 
violations, suppression is required without exception because the benefit of 
deterring police coercion always outweighs the cost of losing evidence 
needed to convict the defendant.288  In the context of self-incrimination and 
reasonable search and seizure violations, on the other hand, suppression is 
subject to many exceptions where the police misconduct was not “suffi-
ciently deliberate” or “sufficiently culpable” to warrant the cost of losing 
valuable evidence.  There are many instances where the prosecution is able 
to use unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the defendant’s trial.289
The variance in the force of the exclusionary rule (absolute intolerance 
of police coercion versus occasional intolerance of police failing to admi-
nister Miranda, or violating search and seizure), coupled with the fact that 
the Supreme Court has found in every instance that the value of deterring 
police misconduct by suppressing the fruits of due process violations out-
weighs the potential cost of losing evidence, demands the conclusion that 
due process violations caused by police coercion are more offensive to jus-
tice and more deserving of protection than self-incrimination and search 
and seizure violations.  It follows that the statements of a coerced witness 
should also be suppressed in order to adequately deter police coercion and 
protect due process rights.  By allowing the use of coerced witness testimo-
ny in a defendant’s trial, the Supreme Court is tacitly signaling that police 
can utilize the coercive tactics to extract information from a third-party—
exactly the type of conduct that the Court seeks to prevent in its confession 
jurisprudence.  Thus, coercion will remain a viable technique in criminal 
investigation.  To adequately deter police coercion, all coerced statements, 
regardless of the speaker (defendant or witness), must be suppressed. 
The extraordinarily high threshold that is required to prove that a state-
ment is involuntary further illustrates the fact that the Supreme Court finds 
 286. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). See supra note 138. 
287. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 153-179 and accompanying text. 
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due process violations to be a greater harm than other police misconduct.290
The courts are required to undertake a fact-intensive analysis, looking at 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.291  No sin-
gle factor is determinative in this analysis of whether the interrogation 
techniques exerted sufficient pressure on an individual as to “overbear peti-
tioner’s will to resist.”292  In fact, in several cases where courts found the 
defendant to have no standing to object to the coerced witness testimony on 
constitutional grounds, the exclusionary rule was never applied because 
they found that the statements were not in fact involuntary.293  Therefore, 
while expanding due process violations to include the use of coerced wit-
ness testimony against a criminal defendant is doctrinally vast, in practice, 
it will affect only a small number of individuals.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
should expand the due process protection afforded to criminal defendants 
and exclude witness testimony that has been coerced by police. 
D. The Policy Considerations that Support the Exclusion of Coerced 
Confessions Will be More Completely Achieved by Excluding Coerced 
Witness Statements 
The underlying premise on which the United States judicial system rests 
is that a criminal suspect is innocent until proven guilty.  As the Supreme 
Court so adeptly stated: “[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial 
system—a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence inde-
pendently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge 
against an accused out of his own mouth.”294  Thus, defendants’ statements 
290. See supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text. 
 292. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961). 
 293. Valdez v. McKune, 266 F. App’x 735, 739 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to find a due 
process violation because even assuming the defendant had standing, the facts did not sup-
port that the witness was improperly coerced); Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 
2008) (finding a teenage mother’s statements voluntary despite the fact that “[t]he officers . . 
. created the impression that unless she cooperated in their investigation of the defendant 
they would make sure she did not get her baby back”); United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 
1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) (denied that the witness statements were involuntary where 
“federal agents contacted [the witness] ‘continuously’ and told him if he did not cooperate 
‘he would be facing 25 to 40 years in jail’ . . . but that they would go easy on him if he 
‘cooperated’”); United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1287-89 (10th Cir. 1999) (state-
ments made by witness found to be voluntary despite the fact that the arrest warrant for the 
witness contained an “escape clause” that asserted the witness would be arrested and held in 
detention unless she “cooperate[d] fully and truthfully and accurately and completely re-
veal[ed]” to the government her involvement in the crimes, despite that the warrant “was 
blatantly tailored to obtain information and testimony” from the witness, because she “could 
escape arrest [only] if she divulged everything she knew about the Garcia homicide”). 
 294. Rogers, 365 U.S. at 541. 
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are admissible into evidence only if they are established to be the product of 
the speaker’s free choice (i.e., voluntary).295
Common law required a defendant’s statements to be voluntary to ensure 
that the evidence was a reliable admission of guilt.296  The Due Process 
Clause demands voluntary statements, and the exclusionary rule deters fu-
ture police misconduct.297  “The due process clause requires that state ac-
tion . . . shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”298
The Court applies the exclusionary rule in an effort to achieve its goal of 
deterring police misconduct.299
This policy objective is unquestionably supported by fifty years of con-
fessional jurisprudence in the United States, establishing a nationwide 
“feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”300  The 
Supreme Court went so far as to say that: “[I]n the end, life and liberty can 
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought 
to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.”301  Moreover, 
physical and psychological police coercion is abhorrent to basic principles 
of human rights and fundamental fairness.302  For these reasons, the Su-
preme Court demands that police refrain from using coercive interrogation 
methods when interrogating a criminal defendant.303
I argue that all coercive police practices pose a similarly severe threat to 
due process rights.  The Supreme Court’s main impetus for excluding the 
product of due process violations is to deter police misconduct.304  The pol-
icy justifications behind the exclusionary rule in the context of coerced 
confessions apply with equal force to coerced witness testimony.  For this 
reason, this Note advocates for the application of the exclusionary rule to 
coerced witness testimony.  By so reading the Due Process Clause, the 
goals of the exclusionary rule are better served because the police cannot 
use the standing requirement as a legal scapegoat in coercing a witness.  
Currently, in jurisdictions where the exclusionary rule does not bar coerced 
295. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 298. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 
U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
299. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.  Whether the exclusionary rule is 
effective in achieving this end is of great debate and beyond the scope of this Note. 
 300. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 
315, 320-21 (1959)). 
301. Id.
302. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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witness testimony, the police are able to evade the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause by coercing witnesses who may or may not have the infor-
mation sought, instead of coercing the defendants themselves.  Take for in-
stance Samuel v. Frank, where the prosecution lacked the direct evidence 
needed to convict the defendant.305  The police attended a child custody 
conference for Tisha, a fifteen-year-old teenage mother, and threatened to 
take her newborn into state custody unless she “cooperated.”306  After the 
infant was placed in foster care, Tisha offered statements to the police in-
criminating the defendant, which were then used in trial against him.307  By 
coercing Tisha, the police avoided having to coerce the defendant into in-
criminating himself, which would have unquestionably been inadmissible 
in trial.  The court justified its decision to admit Tisha’s statements into 
evidence by finding that the State’s behavior was legitimate and not coer-
cive.308  Further, it took comfort in the fact that Tisha’s statements were 
corroborated by other evidence, and discredited the fact that Tisha recanted 
her statements twice in judicial proceedings.309  Even if Tisha’s statements 
were corroborated, it does not explain why the court allowed them to be 
admitted into evidence.  If Tisha’s recanted statements provided informa-
tion that other evidence already established, the court serves no purpose by 
allowing the statements to be admitted.  To the contrary, the court deprived 
the defendant of his right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause and 
actually condoned police misconduct. 
By limiting the exclusionary rule to prohibit only coercion of the defen-
dant, courts fail to effectively pursue the Supreme Court’s stated goal of 
preventing police coercion in law enforcement, and its secondary goals of 
upholding the integrity of the judiciary, and instilling public trust in the le-
gal system.  To effectively achieve these ends, the Supreme Court must ad-
dress the issue of coerced witness statements and forbid their admission 
against a criminal defendant.  Until then, defendants are inadequately pro-
tected from due process violations. 
CONCLUSION
The crux of the matter presented in this Note is that a defendant’s right 
to due process varies depending on the jurisdiction in which he or she is 
prosecuted.  Some courts, such as those in the Seventh Circuit, hold that the 
305. See Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). See supra notes 191-223 
and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text. 
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admissibility of coerced witness testimony is not a constitutional matter, 
but rather an evidentiary one suitable for the jury.310  Other courts, includ-
ing those in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, find that a defendant has standing 
to object to coerced witness testimony on the grounds of a possible due 
process violation.311 This Note argues that the due process rights of a de-
fendant are indeed violated when police coerce a third-party and the result-
ing statements are entered into the defendant’s criminal trial for four rea-
sons.
First, coerced statements are inherently unreliable and should be ex-
cluded on that basis alone.312  It is difficult to ascertain whether a coerced 
statement is representative of the actual truth, but it can be presumed to be 
of untrustworthy quality because of the means by which it was extracted.  
Moreover, coerced witness statements are likely to be more unreliable than 
a defendant’s coerced statements.  While the Supreme Court overtly denies 
reliability as a relevant factor in its due process analysis, this is moot, as it 
is impossible to divorce the voluntariness requirement from an underlying 
concern with reliability.313  By suppressing all coerced witness statements, 
courts are able to easily and uniformly administer the “voluntariness” test, 
and protect a defendant’s due process rights. 
Second, whether a due process right of a defendant has been violated by 
the use of coerced witness testimony at trial is determined by looking at 
whether the witness’s statements were involuntary, not whether there was a 
fair trial.  This serves to limit the scope of the expanded rights being 
granted.
Third, a defendant’s due process rights must be protected.  The exclu-
sionary rule is not an immutable remedy and is only applied when the value 
of deterring police misconduct outweighs the cost of suppressing evidence.  
In the context of due process violations, the Supreme Court has found that 
the value of deterring police coercion is always greater than the cost of los-
ing evidence.  Compare this to the exclusionary rule in the context of self-
incrimination and search and seizure violations—both of which are riddled 
with exceptions and allow tainted evidence to be used against defendants.  
The Supreme Court has implicitly suggested that due process violations are 
a greater harm than other constitutional violations, and require greater pro-
tection.  By finding that the use of coerced witness testimony is violative of 
a defendant’s due process rights, the Supreme Court will announce a rule 
310. See supra notes 217, 222 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra notes 224-255 and accompanying text. 
312. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra notes 265-279 and accompanying text. 
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consistent with that already in place: that due process rights of a defendant 
must be protected at all costs from police coercion. 
Last, the purpose of the exclusionary rule in the context of coerced con-
fessions is to discipline police, as well as to protect the individual rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.  The exclusionary rule is of little value in 
achieving those ends, however, unless the rule is expanded to exclude wit-
ness testimony that has been coerced by police.  Where the police are 
granted an exception through which they may coerce a witness and still 
gain admissible evidence, there is no incentive to comply with the law.  
The Supreme Court must find that a criminal defendant’s right to due 
process is violated where the prosecution enters coerced witness testimony 
into evidence against him.
